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A population of heterogenous agents compeeting through a minority rule is investigated. Agents
which frequently loose are selected for evolution by changing their strategies. The stationary compo-
sition of the population resulting for this self-organization process is computed analytically. Results
are compared with numerical simulations of two different minority games and other analytical treat-
ments available in the literature.
The mechanisms under which a population of compeet-
ing agents self-organizes is a problem which has gained a
lot of imterest among the physics community in the last
few years [1–7]. As in traditional statistical mechanism
the main goal is to determine the average behavior of the
population based on the elementary rules which charac-
terize the competition among agents. Given the actual
state of art most of the works have been devoted to the
characterization, by means of numerical experiments or
analytical treatments, of the different models proposed in
the literature [1–3,7], while a general description is still
missed.
This work is an attempt to extract some general fea-
tures present in the subclass of models where the perfor-
mance of the agents is characterized by certain minority
rule [1,2,7]. Agents are assumed to be heterogeneous and
the main goal is to obtain which is the final composition
of the population if certain evolution mechanism is intro-
duced. The agents will be supposed not to be subscribed
to any regular lattice which rule out the existence of spa-
tial correlations allowing a mean field (MF) treatment.
The work is organized as follows. First the general
features of the class of models under consideration are
introduced. Based on these rules the MF rate equations
describing the evolution of the population are derived and
the stationary solutions are computed. These results are
compared with numerical simulations of two particular
minority ”games”. Moreover, a comparison with the an-
alytical results already available for the model by John-
son et al [3–6] is also drown. In all cases a very good
agreement is obtained.
Considers a population of N (odd) heterogeneous
Boolean agents characterized by certain property x. The
Boolean nature of the agents restrict their action to only
two possibilities. An example is the Arthur-bar problem
[1] in which each agent attend or not a bar based on the
past attendance to the bar. Another example is the mi-
nority game introduced by Challet and Zhang [2] in which
the agents can either buy or sell. In both models a good
choice of x is the probability that an agent takes differ-
ent decisions in two different steps. A different choice is
taken in the model introduced by Johnson et al [3]. In
this case x is the probability that an agent accepts the
decision suggested by its strategy or does the opposite.
In general one make think in x as any property, or set of
properties, which distinguish the different strategies one
agent can choose.
On each step each agent take one of the two decisions
and those being in the minority win. The long time per-
formance of the agents will be characterized by a cumula-
tive index z in such a way that each time an agent win it
is rewarded with a positive point (z → z+1), otherwise it
is punished receiving a negative point (z → z − 1). Evo-
lution in the population is introduced assuming that each
time the performance z of an agent goes below a thresh-
old −zc (zc > 0) it is selected for evolution an change its
strategy: a new value of x (x → x′) is selected among
certain distribution P0(x
′) and its performance is reseted
to zero (z → 0).
A similar evolutionary mechanism has been already
considered in [3]. One also may think in other imple-
mentations like the extremal rules considered in [2,7], or
a probabilistic rule in which agents can change strategy
even below zc according to certain probability, which in
general may depend on z. In any case it is expected that
all of them give the same qualitative behavior in the large
zc limit.
Having defined the model let us determine which is the
stationary composition of the population of agents P (x),
the fraction of agents of type x. For doing so we first
derive the rate equations which describe the dynamical
evolution of P (x), which in general can be written as
∂
∂t
P (x) =
∑
x′
[W (x′, x)P (x′)−W (x, x′)P (x)] , (1)
where W (x′, x) is the transition rate from x′ to x.
The only rule which allows a change on x is the evo-
lution rule, in which the agent chose a new value of
x′, selected with probability P0(x
′). Thus, if λ(x) is
the fraction of x-agents which are changing their strat-
egy per unit time then the transition rates are given by
W (x, x′) = λ(x)P0(x
′). After substitution of this expres-
sion into eq. (1) it results that
∂
∂t
P (x) = P0(x)
∑
x′
λ(x′)P (x′)− λ(x)P (x). (2)
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To determine λ(x) we need to consider the temporal
evolution of the cumulative performance index z(x). Let
Pm(x) be the probability per unit time that a x-agent
is in the minority in one step. Thus, which probability
Pm(x) (1−Pm(x)) the performance increases (decreases)
by one unit. More generaly one can define Pm(x) as the
probability that an agent wins a point, regardless how
it did. On the other hand, if an agent changes strat-
egy, which happens with probability λ(x), then its per-
formance increases by zc. These elementary processes
lead to the rate equation
∂
∂t
z(x) = 2Pm(x)− 1 + zcλ(x). (3)
Provided Pm(x) < 1/2 for all x the system described
by eqs. (2) and eq. (3) will always reach a stationary
state. In this state time derivatives vanish obtaining
λ(x) =
1
zc
[1− 2Pm(x)], (4)
P (x) =
A
1− 2Pm(x)
P0(x), (5)
where A is a normalization constant.
Agents with Pm(x) close to 1/2 are more stable to
change in strategy as it can be seen from eq. (4) and,
therefore, they will have a larger participation ratio in
the stationary population, as follows from eq. (5). The
distribution from which the value of x is extracted is thus
modulated by the probability of being in the minority,
yielding the stationary population in eq. (5).
On the other hand, from eq. (4) it can be seen that in
the limit zc →∞ the fraction of agents changing strategy
becomes infinitesimal and, therefore, in this limit one ex-
pect to obtain the same results as if one use an extremal
evolution rule. Another aspect to be emphasized is the
fact that the parameter zc, which in principle is the only
evidence of the particular evolution rule chosen here, does
not appears in the expression for the stationary distribu-
tion of agents in eq. (5) and, therefore, this result is
expected to hold independent of the particular evolution
rule chosen.
So far the results obtained here are very general and
expected to apply to a wide class of models of Boolean
agents with minority rule. To go further we have to de-
termine Pm(x) which may however depends on the par-
ticular model under consideration. Below two different
cases are analyzed. One is a very simple model of non-
interacting agents (NIA) which make their decision at
random. The other is the very recent implementation of a
population of Boolean agents build up onto a Kauffman’s
network (AKN) introduced by Paczuski and Bassler [7].
In the AKN model introduced in [7] agents makes their
decisions based on the previous decision of some other
agents. A Boolean variable σi (i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; σi = 0, 1)
is assigned to each agent which is representative of the
two possible decisions one agent may take. The decision
taken by each agent is based on the decision took by other
K agents chosen at random (i1, . . . , iK) in the previous
step, according to certain Boolean function fi selected at
random among the set of all the 22
K
possible Boolean
functions with K inputs, i.e.
σi(t+ 1) = fi[σi1(t), . . . , σiK (t)]. (6)
Without lost of generality and for a reason which be-
comes clear below, Booleans functions which give the
same output independent of the inputs are rule out.
In the original variant of this model [7] an extremal
evolution rule is used, such that after certain time the
worst agent is selected for evolution. This rule is relaxed
here with the barrier evolution rule considered above,
which yields the extremal dynamics as zc → ∞. More-
over, one can see that a property that makes differences
among the agents can be the number of times 1 appears
on the M = 2K outputs of its Boolean function, denoted
by n. If n is close to M/2 the agent will give as output 0
or 1, depending on the configuration of its K neighbors,
with approximately the same probability. Otherwise, if n
is close to 1 orM the agent will practically give the same
output independent of the configuration of its neighbors.
The NIA model is a simplification of the above model
in which interactions among agents are rule out. In this
case on each step an n-agent gives 1 as output with
a probability n/M and 0 otherwise. For this case the
agent’s decision does not depends on decisions of any
other agents and, therefore, there is no other correlation
than the one introduced by the minority rule which de-
pends on the output of all agents.
Numerical simulations were performed for a popula-
tion of N = 99 agents and K = 2, 3, 4, 5. In all cases the
system is updated until it reaches the stationary state
and then average is taken over the temporal evolution
of the population. The resulting data is averaged over
different realizations of the initial Boolean functions and
over the choice of neighbors in the interacting case.
Since the new Boolean functions are selected at ran-
dom one has
P0(n) = B(n; 0.5,M)/
M−1∑
r=1
B(r; 0.5,M), (7)
where B(n; p,m) is the Binomial distribution, the prob-
ability to obtain 1 n times and 0 m − n times given on
each single event 1 happens with probability p. The val-
ues n = 0 and M are rule out because they give fixed
strategies and consequently the Binomial distribution is
renormalized.
To compute the stationary composition P (n) one has
to compute the probability Pm(n) that an agent of type
n is in the minority, and then plug in the result in eq.
(5). For N large the game is expected to be symmetric
in the sense that with probability 1/2 the minority is the
group of agents which takes the 1 (or 0) as output. In
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such a case a fixed agent will, in a long time window, have
a probability 1/2 of being in the minority while agents
changing their output very often are expected to has a
lower probability to be in the minority.
The main hypothesis taken here is that 1− 2Pm(n) =
f [ρ(n)], where f [ρ(n)] is a smooth function of the proba-
bility per unit time ρ(n) that an agent change its output.
Since fixed players (ρ = 0) has a probability 1/2 to be
in the minority then f(0) = 0. In the following f(ρ) is
expanded around ρ = 0, keeping only the linear term,
resulting
1− 2Pm(n) ∝ ρ(n) +O[ρ(n)
2]. (8)
Now, for NIA ρ(n) is just the probability to find two
different outputs on the agent’s strategy, which is given
by Pc(n) = 2(n/M)(1−n/M). For AKN one should also
take into account that agents can changes their output
only if at least one of its inputs has changed output in
the previous step. Within a MF approximation the last
event happens with probability Kρ¯. Thus, in general
ρ(n) = BPc(n), (9)
where B = 1 and B = Kρ¯ for NIA and AKN, respec-
tively.
By construction in both models Pc(n) > 0 because
the cases n = 0 and M have been rule out. Hence,
1 − 2Pm(n) ∝ BPc(n) can only be zero if B = 0 and
if does it is zero for all n. If the second possibility hap-
pens then all agents will have the same probability to
be in the minority and, therefore, their distribution in
the stationary state will be the distribution from where
the Boolean functions are extracted, i.e. P (n) = P0(n).
Hence, eqs. (5),(8) and(9) yields the following alternative
P (n) =
{
P¯c
Pc(n)
P0(n) forB > 0
P0(n) forB = 0,
(10)
where P¯c =
∑
n Pc(n)P (n), which is the final output of
the present calculation.
For NIA as mentioned above B = 1 and, therefore, the
alternative B > 0 takes place. The comparison of this
prediction with numerical data is shown in fig. 1. The
agreement is quite well for all values of K, proving that
the ansatz in eq. (9) applies for this model.
For AKN B = Kρ¯ and one should analyze weather ρ¯
is zero or not. As it is well known the Kauffman’s net-
work display qualitative different behavior depending on
the value of K [8]. For K ≤ 2 and independent of the
initial conditions the network evolve to a frozen config-
uration with ρ¯ = 0. On the contrary for K > 2 the
network evolves to periodic orbits with period growing
exponentially with N (”chaotic phase”), in which ρ¯ > 0.
Thus, the population of agents build up onto the Kauff-
man’s network is a very good scenario to test the validity
of eq. (10) because both alternatives can be observed.
The comparison is shown in fig. 1. For K = 2 it can
seen that the numerical data is in better agreement by
P (n) = P0(n) as predicted above. On the contrary for
K > 2 the data is in better agreement with the case
B > 0 in eq. (10).
For K > 2 both the NIA and AKN models yields the
same distribution P (n) and, therefore, the correlations
introduced by the network are in those cases irrelevant.
Moreover with increasing K the composition of the pop-
ulation gradually approaches P0(n) which explains the
lost of self-organization observed in [7].
Finally the model of Johnson et al [3] is considered. In
this case the decisions taken by the agents depends on the
previous history of the winning group. For each agent it is
available the information of which has been the winning
group σw(t) (σw(t) = 0, 1) in the last K steps. More-
over, to each of then and strategy fiis assigned, which
is extracted at random among all the possible Boolean
functions of K inputs. Then, for each possible past his-
tory each agent will give a well defined output based on
its own strategy, i.e.
σi(t+ 1) = fi[σW (t), . . . , σW (t−K + 1)]. (11)
Notices that in this case the output of each agent de-
pends on a global information and not on the outputs of
any other agent as in the AKN model (see eq. (6)).
So far this model is just a variant of the minority game
of Challet and Zhang [2] for the case in which each agent
has only one strategy at his disposal. In the variation by
Johnson et al [3] a probability pi is assigned to each agent
based on which the he accepts or not the output of its
strategy. With probability pi (1−pi) he use the outcome
(the opposite outcome) of its strategy. Moreover, they in-
troduced the cumulative index zi to measure the perfor-
mance of each agent in a similar way as described above.
The only difference is that for this model when zi goes
below the threshold −zc the agent does not change its
Boolean function fi but rather its probability pi, choos-
ing a new one at random in the interval [pi−R/2, pi+R/2]
with reflective boundary conditions.
Some analytical results are already available for this
model [4,6]. Using a diffusion like approach [4] or a de-
tailed probabilistic calculation [6] it has been shown that
in the stationary population has the following composi-
tion
P (p) =
A
1− 2Pm(p)
, (12)
where A is a normalization constant and Pm(p) is the
probability that an agent of type p is in the minority [9].
Eq. (12) is actually quite similar to eq. (5), with the
choice x = p. Since for this model the new values of p
are extracted from a uniform distribution it is expected
that P0(p) does not depend on p. Hence, eq. (12) can
be seen as a limiting case of eq. (5) when applied to the
particular evolution rule of the model by Johnson et al
[3] where P0(x) = const..
In order to go beyond this result one has to deter-
mine Pm(p). This has already been done in [6] resulting
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that for large N 1 − 2Pm(p) ≈ C(N)2p(1 − p) where
C(N) ∼ N−1/2. This results does not seems to have
any relation with the ansatz in eq. (10). However, one
should notice that 2p(1− p) is just the probability Pc(p)
that an agent of type p give two different outputs, given
the output of its Boolean function has remained fixed.
Therefore, from this result and eq. (12) it follows that
P (p) =
P¯c
Pc(p)
. (13)
This eq. is just the B > 0 alternative of eq. (10). Hence,
the functional dependence of Pm(x) and P (x) on Pc(x)
appears to be universal for the class of models studied
here.
In summary, a heterogenous populations of compeet-
ing agents has been studied. Based on general arguments,
such as the minority rule and evolution, the stationary
composition of the population of agents has been com-
puted as a function of the probability Pm(x) of being in
the minority. Further analysis reveals that the relation
1 − 2Pm(x) ∝ Pc(x) is universal for the class of model,
where Pc(x) is the probability that an agent of type x
gives different outputs.
For the AKN it is concluded that except for K = 2
the correlations introduced by the network are irrelevant
and agents can be considered to be independent. In the
particular case K = 2, which correspond to the critical
network, the population build-up onto the Kauffman’s
network reach an stationary state in which all agents have
a probability 1/2 to be or not in the minority. Moreover,
the lost of self-organization with increasing K was shown
to takes place gradually.
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FIG. 1. Stationary composition of the population of agents.
The points where obtained from numerical simulations of a
population of N = 99 agents with a threshold zc = 100 and
K = 2 (squares), K = 3 (circles) and K = 4 (triangles). In
all cases the open and full symbols corresponds to the NIA
and AKN models, respectively. The solid lines are obtained
using eq. (10) with B = 0 (dashed lines) and B > 0 (solid
lines) for the corresponding values of K.
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